When Should the First Amendment Protect Judges from Their Unethical Speech? by Rambo, Lynne H.
When Should the First Amendment Protect Judges
from Their Unethical Speech?
LYNNE H. RAMBO*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION .............................. ........... 279
II. EXTRAJUDICIAL SPEECH PRIOR TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF
JUDICIAL CODES OF CONDUCT ............................. 285
III. THE MODEL CODE PROVISIONS PERTAINING TO
EXTRAJUDICIAL SPEECH ........................... ....... 289
A. The "Political Activity" Rule........ ................ 289
B. The "Pending Action" Rule.......... ............... 292
C. The "Promoting Confidence" Rule ............ ..... 293
IV. EXISTING FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF CODE
RESTRICTIONS ON EXTRAJUDICIAL SPEECH .................. 294
V. DIFFERENT SUPREME COURT APPROACHES TO
DISCIPLINE BASED ON SPEECH ............................. 297
A. The Judicial Candidate Cases: Republican Party
of Minnesota v. White and Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar..298
B. The Attorney Discipline Case: Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada
..... 302
C. The Public Employee Discipline Cases: Pickering v.
Board of Education ....................... ..... 303
VI. A PICKERING ANALYSIS APPROPRIATE TO SITTING JUDGES.........306
A. The Inappropriateness of Strict Scrutiny ............. 306
B. Adapting the Pickering Framework to the Judicial
Discipline Context ................................. 308
C. Presumptions for the State .................. ..... 309
D. A Case Study: Applying the Model Code and Pickering
to Judge Kopf's Remarks .................... .... 311
1. Judge Kopf's Remarks ................. ...... 311
2. Applying the Model Code to Judge Kopfs Remarks......313
3. The Pickering Balance .................. ..... 314
VII. CONCLUSION................................................317
I. INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2016, some ten days before the start of the Republican
National Convention, Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg granted
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interviews to three media outlets: the Associated Press, the New York Times, and
CNN.' Speaking to an Associated Press reporter in her office, Ginsburg said she
presumed that Hillary Clinton would be elected President, and did not "want to
think about [the] possibility" of Donald Trump winning. 2 Shortly thereafter,
speaking with Adam Liptak of the Times, she repeated her discomfort with
Trump and went further:
I can't imagine what this place would be ... with Donald Trump as our
president .... For the country, it could be four years. For the court, it could
be-I don't even want to contemplate that.
[My husband would have said,] "Now it's time for us to move to New
Zealand". . .3
By the time she sat down with CNN early the next week, Ginsburg was
ready to be very specific about Trump: "He is a faker[.] ... He has no
consistency about him. He says whatever comes into his head at the moment.
He really has an ego." 4 She also asked, "How has he gotten away with not
turning over his tax returns? The press seems to be very gentle with him on
that."s
For her candor, Justice Ginsburg was roundly criticized. Donald Trump
called upon her to resign. 6 Legal experts deemed her actions "facially unethical"
1 Adam Liptak, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, No Fan of Donald Trump, Critiques Latest
Term, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2016), http-//www.nytimes.com/2016/07/11/us/politics/nith-bader-
ginsburg-no-fan-of-donald-trump-critiques-latest-term.html (on file with Ohio State Law
Journal); Mark Sherman, AP Interview: Ginsburg Reflects on Big Cases, Scalia's Death, AP
NEws (July 8, 2016), http://bigstory.ap.orglarticle/0da3a641190742669ccOd01b90cd57fa/ap-
interview-ginsburg-reflects-big-cases-scalias-death [https://perma.cc/3RD2-BLW5]; Jeffrey
Toobin, Ruth Bader Ginsburg's Slam of Trump, CNN (July 13, 2016),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/
12/opinions/ruth-bader-ginsburg-trump-toobin/index.html [https://perma.cc/5TAT-UCCM].
2 Sherman, supra note 1.
3 Liptak, supra note 1.
4 Toobin, supra note 1.
5 Id
6 Doina Chiacu, Responding to Criticism, Trump Calls on Justice Ginsburg To Resign,
REUTERS (July 13, 2016), http//www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-ginsburg-idUSK
CNOZT1HG [https://perma.cc/2AGE-59UM].
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and "jaw-dropping." 7 Both the New York Times8 and the Washington Post9
wrote admonishing editorials. Ultimately, Justice Ginsburg issued a statement
expressing regret that she had spoken so openly about Trump: "Judges should
avoid commenting on a candidate for public office," and so "[i]n the future I
will be more circumspect."1 0
In stark contrast to Justice Ginsburg's statements stands the behavior of
another federal judge, federal district judge Gonzalo Curiel. Judge Curiel
7 David G. Savage, The Public Feud of Ginsburg Vs. Trump Casts Harsh Spotlight on
Court's Liberal Lion, L.A. TIMES (July 13, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-
ginsburg-trump-feud-20160713-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/C6XF-MYWJ]; see also
Michael Biesecker, Ginsburg's Public Trump Critique Raises Ethical Quandaries,
MORNING CALL (July 13, 2016), http://www.mcall.com/news/local/elections/mc-ginsburg-
s-public-trump-critique-raises-ethical-quandaries-20160713-story.html [https://perma.cc/K
Q4U-EFNE].
8 Editorial, Donald Trump Is Right About Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, N.Y. TIMES
(July 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/opinion/donald-trump-is-right-about-
justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg.html?smid-tw-
nytimes&smtyp-cur& r- I &mtref-undefined&assetType
=opinion (on file with Ohio State Law Journal).
9 Editorial, Justice Ginsburg's Inappropriate Comments on Donald Trump, WASH.
POST (July 12,2016), https//www.washingtonpostcom/opinions/justice-ginsburgs-inappmpriate-
comments-on-donald-trump/2016/07/12/981df404-4862-11e6-bdb9-
701687974517_story.html?hpid hp_no-nameopinion-card-c/o3Ahomepage%2Fstory&tid=a inl
[https//permacc/4JWJ-7Y2A].
10 Amy Howe, Ginsburg Walks Back Comments on Trump, SCOTUSBLOG (July 14,
2016), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/07/ginsburg-walks-back-comments-on-trump/
[https://perma.cc/4BT6-7QNV] (alteration in original). Justice Ginsburg may have become
more circumspect about political candidates, but not so much about political issues. In an
interview just three months later with Katie Couric, Justice Ginsburg called Colin
Kaepemick's National Anthem protests (kneeling, in recognition of race discrimination)
"dumb and disrespectful." Sarah B. Boxer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Trump, Kaepernick and
Her Lifelong Love ofthe Law, YAHOO! NEWS (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.yahoo.com/katie
couric/ruth-bader-ginsburg-on-trump-kaepemick-and-her-lifelong-love-of-the-law- 132236
633.html [https://perma.cc/92E9-QLMC]. She also declined to answer Couric's questions
about "ban[ning] an entire religious group" from the country, on the ground that it involved
an issue that might come before the Court. Id. But she went on to say:
All I can say is I am sensitive to discrimination on any basis because I have
experienced that upset.. . . I looked at that sign, and I said, "I am a Jew, but I'm an
American, and Americans are not supposed to say such things,".... America is known
as a country that welcomes people to its shores. All kinds of people. The image of the
Statue of Liberty with Emma Lazarus' famous poem. She lifts her lamp and welcomes
people to the golden shore, where they will not experience prejudice because of the
color of their skin, the religious faith that they follow.
Id (first alteration in original). Four days later, she issued a statement to reporters about her
Kaepernick comments: "Barely aware of the incident or its purpose, my comments were
inappropriately dismissive and harsh. I should have declined to respond." Adam Liptak, Ruth
Bader Ginsburg Regrets Speaking Out on Colin Kaepernick, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/15/us/ruth-bader-ginsburg-colin-kaepemick-national-
anthem.html (on file with Ohio State Law Journal).
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presided over two class actions in which the plaintiffs complained that Trump
University defrauded them." After the judge denied summary judgment,12
Donald Trump attacked the judge bitterly.1 3 Trump described Judge Curiel as
"a total disgrace" and "a hater of Donald Trump," and claimed that Curiel had
"an inherent conflict of interest" because of his "Mexican heritage."' 4 Trump
asserted that Curiel's "Mexican heritage"-Curiel was born and reared in
Indiana to immigrant parents-made it impossible for him to be fair to Trump
given Trump's plans to build a wall between the United States and Mexico.15
In response, Judge Curiel said ... nothing.1 6 And he garnered near
universal support. The National Review, Newt Gingrich, Governor John Kasich,
Speaker of the House Paul Ryan, and Senators Mitch McConnell and Bob
Corker all denounced Trump's comments.17 Paul Ryan described the comments
as the very definition of "racist."18 The Wall Street Journal called on Trump to
apologize.19
Both of these episodes raise ethical questions bearing on extrajudicial
speech.20 Justice Ginsburg stepped out of her judicial role and planted her feet
squarely in the political arena. Were she a lower federal court judge, she would
have violated the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, which says, "A
11 Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Sorry, Donald Trump, the Trump University Judge Was Just
Following the Law, WASH. POST (June 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-
checker/wp/2016/06/07/sorry-donald-trump-the-mexican-judge-was-just-following-the-law/?utm_
term=.7fbc0173485c [https//perma.cc/DM55-6KG2].12 Id
13 Brent Kendall, Trump Says Judge's Mexican Heritage Presents 'Absolute Conflict,'
WALL ST. J. (June 3, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-keeps-up-attacks-
on-judge-gonzalo-curiel-1464911442 (on file with Ohio State Law Journal).
14Id
15 Id
161d ("An assistant in Judge Curiel's chambers said he wasn't commenting on the
matter.").
17 Brian Freeman, WSW: Trump Must Apologize to Judge Curiel, NEWSMAX (June 6,
2016), http//www.newsmax.com/Politics/us-trump-apologize-judge-curiel/2016/06/06/id/732483/
[https://perma.c/4MTQ-DG2B]; Nick Gass, Trump Has Republicans Squirming with
'Mexican' Judge Attacks, POLIrICO (June 6, 2016),
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/trump-judge-republicans-respond-223942
[https://perma.cc/3QU3-RX9J]; Gingrich, McConnell, Top Republicans Slam Trump's
Remarks on Hispanic Judge, NEWSMAX (June 5, 2016), http://www.newsmax.com/Headline
hispanic-judget-trump-gingrich/2016/06/05/id/732376/#ixzz4Ao5a63Jf [https://permacc/GV4T-
UT6G].
18 Tim Hains, Ryan: Trump's Attack on Judge Curiel "Textbook" Racism,
REALCLEARPOLITICS (June 7, 2016), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2016/06/07/ryan
tmumps attack onjudgecuriel textbookracism.htnl [https://perma.cc/75P8-F2D8].
I9Paul Gigot, Opinion, Trump and the 'Mexican' Judge, WALL ST. J. (June 5, 2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-and-the-mexican-judge-1465167405 (on file with Ohio
State Law Journal).
20 The term "extrajudicial speech," as it will be used in this Article, means speech not
in connection with a judge's judicial duties.
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judge should not ... publicly endorse or oppose a candidate ... ."21 The
members of the Supreme Court, however, are not bound by that code.22 Their
ethics are a matter of self-discipline. 23
Judge Curiel acted entirely within that code of conduct. Canon 3(A)(6)
prohibits a judge from making any comment on a pending or impending case,
and so the judge remained silent.24 And the Federal Code does not allow an
exception for a judge to respond to a comment, even when it is directed to him
or her personally. 2 5
So, these are the answers under the Code. But the constitutional principles
applicable to extrajudicial speech are not at all clear. Does Justice Ginsburg have
a First Amendment right to criticize Trump regardless of what any rules say?
Does Judge Curiel have a First Amendment right to respond when he is
challenged by a litigant in the national press?
Surprisingly, most of the state and federal courts deciding judicial discipline
cases based on extrajudicial speech have not addressed the constitutionality of
the code provisions involved. 2 6 Nor has the Supreme Court decided what
constitutional standard should be applied to the discipline of sitting judges. The
Court has issued two important decisions addressing the free speech rights of
judicial candidates, 27 but it has not yet reached the question of sitting judges.28
2 1 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, Code of Conduct for United States
Judges, in 2A GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, canon 5(A)(2) [hereinafter Federal Judicial
Code], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/vol02a-ch0 2_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/VN6Q-.
VECJ] (last updated Mar. 20, 2014).
22 The Code of Conduct for United States Judges, by its terms, applies only to the courts
beneath the Supreme Court. Id at 2.
23 According to Chief Justice Roberts, the members of the Supreme Court treat the Code
as a "current and uniform source of guidance," but are not bound by it. CHIEF JUSTICE
ROBERTS, 2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 5 (Dec. 2011),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/ 2 01 I year-endreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SV2Q-HHNZ].
24Federal Judicial Code, supra note 21, canon 3(A)(6).
2 5 The federal Code and the state codes, the latter based on the 2007 Model Code of
Judicial Conduct, see Thomas E. Hornsby, The American Bar Association (ABA) 2007 Model
Code of Judicial Conduct: What Does it Mean to Juvenile and Family Court Judges?, 62
Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 67, 69 (2011), differ on this point. The Model Code would permit Judge
Curiel to respond. Rule 2.10 provides that "a judge may respond directly or through a third
party to allegations in the media or elsewhere concerning the judge's conduct in a matter,"
as long as the statement could not "reasonably be expected to affect the outcome or impair
the fairness" of the matter pending. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.10(A), (E) (AM.
BAR ASS'N 2011).
26 See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
27 Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1659 (2015); Republican Party of Minn.
v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768 (2002).
2 8 See White, 536 U.S. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Whether the rationale of
Pickering v. Board of Ed of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U.S. 563, 568
(1968), and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), could be extended to allow a general
speech restriction on sitting judges--regardless of whether they are campaigning-in order
to promote the efficient administration ofjustice, is not an issue raised here.").
2832018]
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This Article proceeds from the premise that judges harm the judicial
institution, and therefore our constitutional government, when they engage in
inflammatory or overtly political extrajudicial speech, especially speech in
violation of the nation's various ethical codes. As Justice Frankfurter wrote,
"[t]he Court's authority-possessed of neither the purse nor the sword-
ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction." 29 To the
extent that judges enter the public debate with controversial or partisan views,
they render it unlikely that citizens will see them as the neutral and
contemplative arbiters that justice requires.30 This would seem especially true,
and that much more dangerous, in times like these, when the citizenry is as
polarized as it has ever been.31
This is certainly not to suggest the silencing of extrajudicial speech. As the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes, judges are encouraged to engage
in a variety of extrajudicial activities that do not interfere with the judicial
function. 32 Nor is it to suggest that judges go unprotected by the First
Amendment when they do choose to speak in violation of ethics codes. It is to
advocate instead for a moderated protection.
This Article argues that the free speech rights of sitting judges should be
subject to the balancing test applied to public employees in Pickering v. Board
ofEducation,33 albeit with important modifications. Part II describes the attitude
toward extrajudicial speech prior to the development of ethical codes. Part E
sets forth those portions of state and federal ethical codes that restrict judges'
extrajudicial speech and describes for illustration some of the cases that have
arisen under those code provisions. Part IV discusses the approaches state and
federal courts have taken thus far when applying the First Amendment to ethical
code violations. Part V presents the Supreme Court precedent addressing
disciplinary actions based on speech: the judicial candidate cases, the lawyer
discipline case, and the public employee case law. And Part VI concludes that
2 9 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).3 0 Dahlia Lithwick & Sonja West, When Do Supreme Court Justices Need To Just Sit
Down and Be Quiet?, SLATE (Dec. 14, 2010),
http://www.slate.com/articles/newsandpoliticsjurisprudence/2010/12unplugged~htnil
[https//perma.cc/PBV3-Y77G].
3 1Political Polarization in the American Public, PEw REs. CTR. (June 12, 2014),
http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/
[https://perma.cc/6W9Z-GWV6].
32 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 25, r. 3.1 (Extrajudicial
Activities in General); id. at r. 3.7 (Participation in Educational, Religious, Charitable,
Fraternal, or Civic Organizations and Activities). Indeed, the Justices of the Supreme Court
have been very prolific writers. Professor Ronald Collins has compiled a list of 353 books
written by Supreme Court Justices. Ronald Collins, 353 Books by Supreme Court Justices,
SCOTUSBLOG, http//www.scotusblog.com/2012/03/351-books-by-supreme-court-justices/
[https://perma.ccNL24-2MAM] (last updated Nov. 7, 2012). A close count of that list, and the
books' publication dates, reveals that forty-five Justices wrote books during their tenure. See
id.
33 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
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the Court would do best to adopt the Pickering balancing test to evaluate judicial
discipline cases, applying a presumption in favor of the State when the rule
narrowly and specifically defines the conduct to be avoided.
II. EXTRAJUDICIAL SPEECH PRIOR TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL
CODES OF CONDUCT
In the Federalist No. 73, Alexander Hamilton wrote: "It is impossible to
keep the judges too distinct from every other avocation than that of expounding
the laws." 34 From the founding, then, there was an ideal ofj udges removed from
the political arena. Of course, whatever the ideal, the judges hardly stayed unto
themselves "expounding the laws." 35 Chief Justice John Jay served as
ambassador to Great Britain, and Justice Oliver Ellsworth ambassador to
France, while on the Court.36 Chief Justice Jay and Justice William Cushing ran
for governor of their respective states, New York and Massachusetts. 37 Justices
Bushrod Washington and Samuel Chase campaigned actively for presidential
candidates Charles Pinckney and John Adams during the election of 1800.38
Many judges observed no distinction between their judicial duties and their
political activities. In 1803, in his position as Associate Justice, Justice Chase
delivered a charge to a Maryland grand jury.39 A Federalist, Justice Chase used
the charge to attack both Republican legislation that had abolished circuit courts
created by the Adams Administration and the universal suffrage that had been
proposed by the new Maryland Constitution.40 The Federalist press defended
his remarks, but the Republican Congress made them the basis of an
impeachment charge.41 The eighth impeachment charge against Chase
described his political comments as "conduct highly censurable in any, but
peculiarly indecent and unbecoming in a judge of the supreme court of the
United States." 42 Chase was not convicted, but the vote on the eighth charge
was nineteen out of thirty-four, the greatest number of votes for conviction on
any of the charges.43
Chase's impeachment (and near conviction) seems to have persuaded the
judiciary that its grand jury charges, and other judicial appearances, should no
34 TIE FEDERALIST No. 73 (Alexander Hamilton).
35
_d
36 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 273-76 (rev.
ed. 1947); Alan F. Westin, Out-of-Court Commentary by United States Supreme Court
Justices, 1790-1962: Of Free Speech and Judicial Lockjaw, 62 COLuM. L. REv. 633, 637-
38(1962).
3 7 WARREN, supra note 36, at 273-76.
3 8 Westin, supra note 36, at 637-38.
39 WARREN, supra note 36, at 276.
40 
_d
4 11d at 277 & n.1.
42 1 SAMUEL H. SMITH & THOMAS LLOYD, TRIAL OF SAMUEL CHASE 8 (1805).
43 2 SAMUEL H. SMITH & THOMAS LLOYD, TRIAL OF SAMUEL CHASE 492-93(1805).
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longer include overtly political speeches. The practice of electioneering from
the bench largely ceased.44 As Professor Lawrence Friedman has described it:
There would be no more impeachments, but also no more Chases. What carried
the day, in a sense, was the John Marshall solution. The judges would take
refuge in professional decorum. It would always be part of their job to make
and interpret policy; but policy would be divorced from overt, partisan politics.
Principles and policy would flow, at least ostensibly, from the logic of law;
they would not follow the naked give and take of the courthouse square. Justice
would be blind; and it would wear a poker face.4 5
The government would hopefully become "a government of laws, and not of
men." 4 6
Unfortunately, the Chase impeachment did not cause judges to do away with
political activities altogether. They may have divorced law and politics while on
the bench, but they continued to engage in political activities extrajudicially.
Judicial scholar and Judge Jon C. Blue has identified more than a dozen
instances throughout the nineteenth century in which Supreme Court Justices
became deeply immersed in presidential politics or the politics of their home
states while they were serving on the Court.4 7
This began to shift-and the judicial role to change once more-in the early
part of the twentieth century. The Supreme Court was in a belligerent mode in
defense of property, striking federal antitrust legislation in United States v. E. C.
Knight Co.,48 and state workplace legislation in Lochner v. New York.49 To
justify this countermajoritarian position, the Court emphasized the judiciary's
unique and separate function. 50 No one did this with more power than
conservative Republican presidential candidate (and then-Secretary of War)
William Howard Taft.5 1 In a 1908 campaign speech, he said:
4 GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN
MARSHALL, 1801-15, at 245 (1981). An important exception must be noted in Justice Joseph
Story. From at least 1815 through 1830, Story, a passionate abolitionist, used grand jury
charges to denounce the slave trade coming through New England ports. 1 LIFE AND LETTERS
OF JOSEPH STORY 336-48 (William W. Story ed., 1851).
4 5 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 132 (2d ed. 1985).46 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
47 Jon C. Blue, A Well-Tuned Cymbal? Extrajudicial Political Activity, 18 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1, 39-41 (2004) (describing political activities of Justices Story, McLean,
Wayne, Catron, Grier, Nelson, Swayne, Davis, Clifford, Field, Miller, Strong, Bradley,
Brewer, Moody, Hughes, and Chief Justices Taney, Chase, and Fuller).
48 United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1895).
4 9 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).50 See id at 56-57 ("This is not a question of substituting the judgment of the court for
that of the legislature. If the act be within the power of the State it is valid, although the
judgment of the court might be totally opposed to the enactment of such a law.").51 See generally William Howard Taft, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/us-
presidents/william-howard-taft [https-//perma.cclLRN2-9V39].
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[R]easonable persons now recognize the advantage of ceremony-not only in
religious worship, but also in the discharge of many other functions analogous
to religious worship in their sacred character.
Take the administration of justice. It is well that judges should be clothed
in robes, not only, that those who witness the administration of justice should
be properly advised that the function performed is one different from, and
higher, than that which a man discharges as a citizen in the ordinary walks of
life; but also, in order to impress the judge himself with the constant
consciousness that he is a high-priest in the temple ofjustice and is surrounded
with obligations of a sacred character that he cannot escape and that require his
utmost care, attention and self-suppression. 52
Taft served only one term in the presidency, but in 1921, he was appointed
and confirmed as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. 53 Within a year, the
American Bar Association (ABA) created a Committee on Judicial Ethics and
named Chief Justice Taft chair.54 In 1924, that Committee presented to the ABA
House of Delegates the Canons ofJudicial Ethics.5 5
The Canons included thirty-six "principles." 56 One of them-Canon 28-
clearly drew from Chief Justice Taft's separatist, nonpolitical vision of the
judge's role. It provided:
While entitled to entertain his personal views of political questions, and while
not required to surrender his rights or opinions as a citizen, it is inevitable that
suspicion of being warped by political bias will attach to a judge who becomes
the active promoter of the interests of one political party as against another. He
should avoid making political speeches, making or soliciting payment of
assessments or contributions to party funds, the public endorsement of
candidates for political office and participation in party conventions. 57
Thus, the Canons reflected the first commitment to a code ofjudicial ethics, and
Canon 28 the first commitment to limits on judges' extrajudicial political
activity.58
52 WLLIAM H. TAFT, PRESENT DAY PROBLEMS 63-64 (1908). Taft had served on the
Sixth Circuit from 1892-1900, and on the Ohio Superior Court from 1887-1890. ALPHEUS
THOMAS MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: CIEF JUSTICE 12 (1965).
53 Justices of the Supreme Court During the Time of These Reports, 257 U.S. iii, iii n.2
(1921).
54 Andrew J. Lievense & Avern Cohn, The Federal Judiciary and the ABA Model Code:
The Parting of the Ways, 28 JUST. Sys. J. 271, 273 (2007); The Proposed Canons ofJudicial
Ethics, 9 A.B.A. J. 73, 73 (1923).
5 5 LISA L. MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 132 (1992).
56 Id at 132.
57 1d at 139 n.2.
58 According to Chief Justice Taft, the canons were intended only as a "guide and
reminder to the judiciary." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 25, at xi (citing
Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics, 9 GEO. J.
2018] 287
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
Over the next decades, the Canons drew criticism that they were not
designed to be enforceable, and failed to provide "firm guidance for the solution
of difficult questions." 59 So the ABA convened a Special Committee on
Standards of Judicial Conduct under the direction of California Supreme Court
Justice Roger Traynor, and in 1972, approved the first Model Code of Judicial
Conduct designed to be enforceable. 60 Since then, there have been two major
revisions, one in 1990, and one in 2007.61 Currently, thirty-five states have
adopted a version of the 2007 Model Code, 62 and many more appear on their
way to doing so.63
The federal courts' Code of Conduct for United States Judges is itself a
version of the ABA's Model Rules,M with a few significant differences. First,
LEGAL ETHICS 1059, 1065 n.26 (1996)). Many states, however, not only adopted the canons,
but transformed them into law and established sanctions for their violation. Id59 Robert B. McKay, Judges, the Code ofJudicial Conduct, and Nonjudicial Activities,
1972 UTAH L. REV. 391, 391 (1972).6 0 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 25, at xi.6 1Id at xii-xiii.
6 2 See AM. BAR ASS'N, STATUS OF STATE REVIEW OF ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT (2007) (Aug. 2016), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional responsibility/
resources/judicialethics regulation/mcjc.html [https://perma.cc/5FUK-36UT]. This includes
Montana, which, prior to 2008, had not adopted any version of the ABA Model Code, but
was still adhering to the 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics. See In re 2008 Mont. Code of
Judicial Conduct, No. AF 08-0203, 2008 Mont. LEXIS 825, at *1-3 (Mont. Dec. 12, 2008).
63 One state has proposed revisions in line with the 2007 Code, and ten states have
established committees to review their codes for updating. AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 62,
at 1-8. The remaining five states appear to be content for the moment operating under the
1990 version of the Code. See id
6 The Judicial Conference of the United States is responsible for setting policy for the
lower federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2012). In June 1969, in the wake of controversies
involving Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas and Tenth Circuit federal district judge Stephen
Chandler, Chief Justice Earl Warren convened the Conference for a special session to address
judicial ethics, and the Conference resolved to formulate standards of judicial conduct.
Lievense & Cohn, supra note 54, at 275; see also REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 13-14, 1969 AND JUNE 10, 1969, at
41-43 (1969),
http-//www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConference/Proceedings/Prceedings.aspx
?doc=/uscourts/FederalCourtsjudconflproceedings/1969-03.pdf [https://perma.cc8QVG-FS64].
Within the same time frame, the ABA created the committee chaired by California Justice
Traynor to develop a model code, and asked the Judicial Conference to work with that
committee in the review of the 1924 Canons and the drafting of the new code, and the
Conference agreed. Lievense & Cohn, supra note 54, at 275. This led the Judicial Conference
to create its Committee on Codes of Conduct, and so after the ABA approved the 1972 Model
Code, it took little time for the Judicial Conference to adopt the Code as well. Id at 276; see
also REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
APRIL 5-6, 1973, at 10 (1973),
http-//www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConference/Proceedings/Proceedings.aspx?doc=/u
scourts/FederalCourts/judconf/proceedings/1973-04.pdf [https://perma.cc/BH9D-CQLY].
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the Judicial Conference has not adopted the 2007 revisions. 65 Second, in 1992,
in the course of reviewing the 1990 proposed revisions, the Conference changed
the mandatory word "shall," throughout, to the permissive "should," 66 so that
the Code itself serves more as a set of guidelines. Third, discipline in the federal
system is administered by judicial councils within each circuit, and those
councils can discipline Article I judges, but cannot remove them, because the
Constitution provides for judicial impeachment by the House of
Representatives. 67
Because so many jurisdictions include provisions similar or identical to the
Model Code, the next Part will include in the text only provisions from the 2007
Model Code, and address the Federal Code of Conduct for United States Judges
only to the extent it differs materially.
III. THE MODEL CODE PROVISIONS PERTAINING TO EXTRAJUDICIAL
SPEECH
The Model Code includes several provisions that restrict extrajudicial
speech. Some of these are very specific, flatly prohibiting certain topics of
speech. Others are aimed at specific topics of speech, but prohibit the speech
only under certain standards of impact that a disciplinary authority would have
to apply. And if none of the specific rules apply, the Code includes a general
directive concerningjudicial behavior that has been invoked to punish untoward
extrajudicial speech.
A. The "Political Activity" Rule
Canon 4 of the Model Code provides that "[a] judge or candidate for judicial
office shall not engage in political or campaign activity that is inconsistent with
the independence, integrity, or impartiality of the judiciary." 68 Rule 4.1,
65 See Lievense & Cohn, supra note 54, at 271 ("[T]he 2007 ABA Model Code's forms
[are] unlikely to be adopted by the Judicial Conference"); Cynthia Gray, Adoption and
Adaption, NAT'L CTR. FOR ST. CTs.: JUD. ETHICs & DIsCIPLINE (July 21, 2015),
https://ncscjudicialethicsbIog.org/2015/07/21/adoption-and-adaption/ [https//permacc/CQ75-
3WRM].
6 6 Lievense & Cohn, supra note 54, at 278; see also REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, SEPTEMBER 22, 1992, at 62 (Sept. 1992),
httpJ/www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConference/ProceedingsProceedings.aspx?doc=/u
scourts/FederalCourts/judconf/proceedings/1992-09.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4AF-Q4R3] ("In
August 1990, the American Bar Association approved a New Model Code of Judicial
Conduct. In light of this New Model Code, the Committee on the Codes of Conduct
conducted a comprehensive review of the Judicial Conference's Code of Conduct for United
States Judges and recommended revisions to the Code.").
67 28 U.S.C. § 354(a)(3)(A) (2012) ("Article III judges.-Under no circumstances may
the judicial council order removal from office of any judge appointed to hold office during
good behavior.").
68MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 25, canon 4.
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promulgated under this Canon, sets forth a lengthy list of highly specific
prohibitions on speech:
(A) Except as permitted by law, ... a judge or a judicial candidate shall not:
(1) act as a leader in, or hold an office in, a political organization; 69
(2) make speeches on behalf of a political organization;
(3) publicly endorse or oppose a candidate for any public office;
(4) solicit funds for, pay an assessment to, or make a contribution to a political
organization or a candidate for public office;
(5) attend or purchase tickets for dinners or other events sponsored by a
political organization or a candidate for public office;
(6) publicly identify himself or herself as a candidate of a political
organization;
(7) seek, accept, or use endorsements from a political organization;
(8) personally solicit or accept campaign contributions other than through a
campaign committee authorized by Rule 4.4;
(9) use or permit the use of campaign contributions for the private benefit of
the judge, the candidate, or others;
(10) use court staff, facilities, or other court resources in a campaign forjudicial
office;
(11) knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth, make any false or
misleading statement;
(12)make any statement that would reasonably be expected to affect the
outcome or impair the fairness of a matter pending or impending in any
court; or
(13)in connection with cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come
before the court, make pledges, promises, or commitments that are
inconsistent with the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of
judicial office.70
The Comment to Rule 4.1 makes clear that it is the nonpolitical nature of
judging-in contrast to the political nature of the legislative and executive
branches-that supports the rule.7 1 Because judges make decisions based on the
facts and law of every case, rather than the preferences of the electorate, "judges
and judicial candidates must, to the greatest extent possible, be free and appear
69 A "political organization" is defined by the Code as "a political party or other group
sponsored by or affiliated with a political party or candidate, the principal purpose of which
is to further the election or appointment of candidates for political office." Id. at 7.70 1d. r. 4.1 (references omitted). The federal counterpart of this provision is Canon
5(A), which states that:
A judge should not: (1) act as a leader or hold any office in a political organization; (2)
make speeches for a political organization or candidate, or publicly endorse or oppose
a candidate for public office; or (3) solicit funds for, pay an assessment to, or make a
contribution to a political organization or candidate, or attend or purchase a ticket for a
dinner or other event sponsored by a political organization or candidate.
Federal Judicial Code, supra note 21, canon 5(A).
71 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 25, r. 4.1 cmts. 1, 3.
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to be free from political influence and political pressure." 72 If they are seen to
be subject to political influence, "[p]ublic confidence in the independence and
impartiality of the judiciary is eroded." 73
Particularly in light of recent events, one case invoking the federal
counterpart to this rule merits special attention. In June 2004, Second Circuit
Court of Appeals Judge Guido Calabresi attended an American Constitution
Society (ACS) convention. 74 There had been a panel discussion entitled, "The
Election: What's at Stake for American Law and Policy," and Judge Calabresi
spoke from the floor. 75
Okay, I'm a judge and so I'm not allowed to talk politics and so I'm not going
to talk about some of the issues which were mentioned or what some have said
is the extraordinary record of incompetence of this administration .... I'm
going to talk about . .. the fact that in a way that occurred before but is rare in
the United States, that somebody came to power as a result of the illegitimate
acts of a legitimate institution that had the right to put somebody in power. That
is what the Supreme Court did in Bush versus Gore. . . . The reason I
emphasize that is because that is exactly what happened when Mussolini was
put in by the King of Italy, that is, the King of Italy had the right to put
Mussolini in though he had not won an election and make him Prime Minister.
That is what happened when Hindenburg put Hitler in. I'm not suggesting for
a moment that Bush is Hitler. I want to be clear on that, but it is a situation
which is extremely unusual. When somebody has come in in that way they
sometimes have tried not to exercise much power. In this case, like Mussolini,
he has exercised extraordinary power. He has exercised power, claimed power
for himself that has not occurred since Franklin Roosevelt. 76
In a letter written shortly after the incident, the judge apologized to the Chief
Judge of the Second Circuit,77 but five complaints were filed, several of which
alleged that the judge had violated the rule prohibiting the public opposition of
a candidate for public office.7 8 Because Judge Calabresi had admitted as
72 Id. cmt. 1.
73 Id cmt. 3.
74 1n re Charges of Judicial Misconduct, 404 F.3d 688, 691 (2d Cir. Jud. Council 2005).
75 Id.
76 Id.
77Id at 691-92. Judge Calabresi wrote:
As you know, I strongly deplore the politicization of the judiciary and firmly
believe that judges should not publicly support candidates or take political stands.
Although what I was trying to do was make a rather complicated academic argument
about the nature of reelections after highly contested original elections, that is not the
way my words, understandably, have been taken. I can also see why this occurred,
despite my statements at the time that what I was saying should not be construed in a
partisan way. For that I am deeply sorry.
Id at 692.78 1d at 695. The federal counterpart of Rule 4.1 of the Model Code was, at that time,
Canon 7(A)(2). Id.
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much, 79 the Council decided that his public admonishment by the Chief Judge
was sufficient sanction. 80
B. The "Pending Action" Rule
Model Rule 2.10 imposes another substantial restriction on extrajudicial
speech. Under the rule,
(A) A judge shall not make any public statement that might reasonably be
expected to affect the outcome or impair the fairness of a matter pending
or impending in any court, or make any nonpublic statement that might
substantially interfere with a fair trial or hearing.
(B) A judge shall not, in connection with cases, controversies, or issues that
are likely to come before the court, make pledges, promises, or
commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial performance of the
adjudicative duties ofjudicial office.81
According to the Code, the rule's restrictions "are essential to the
maintenance of the independence, integrity, and impartiality of thejudiciary." 82
With respect to public comment on pending or impending cases, there are three
concerns. When the case is in a judge's own court, the fear is that the judge's
comment will leave the impression that the case has been unfairly prejudged. 83
When the case is in another judge's court, the fear is that the public will question
why there are differences in the views of different judges, 84 or will believe that
the speaking judge is trying to influence the other.85
79 1d. at 695-96.
80In re Charges, 404 F.3d at 697.
81 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 25, r. 2.10 (references omitted).82 Id. r. 2.10, cmt. 1.83 Broadman v. Comm'n on Judicial Performance, 959 P.2d 715, 727 (Cal. 1998)
("[T]he public may perceive the comment as indicating that the judge has prejudged the
merits of the controversy or is biased against or in favor of one of the parties."); In re Benoit,
523 A.2d 1381, 1383 (Me. 1987) ("[The rule] minimizes the risk that such comments
will ... unfairly prejudge individuals' rights . . . ."); In re Broadbelt, 683 A.2d 543, 548 (N.J.
1996) (per curiam) ("[The rule] thereby minimizes the risk that such comments will either
unfairly prejudge individuals' rights or create a public impression that citizens are not being
treated fairly because different judges may not agree as to how those citizens' rights should
be decided under the law.").
84 Benoit, 523 A.2d at 1383 ("[The rule] minimizes the risk that such comments
will . . . create a public impression that citizens are not being treated fairly because different
judges may not agree as to how those citizens' rights should be decided under the law.");
Broadbelt, 683 A.2d at 548 ("By prohibiting judges from commenting on pending cases in
any court, we avoid the possibility of undue influence on the judicial process and the threat
to public confidence posed by a judge from one jurisdiction criticizing the rulings or
technique of ajudge from a different jurisdiction.").
85 Broadman, 959 P.2d at 727 ("[TIhe public may perceive the comment as an attempt
to influence the judge who is charged with deciding the case.").
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The public comment part of this rule, its predecessors, and its federal
counterpart,86 has served as the basis for sanctions or disqualification in a
number of high-profile cases. In Broadman v. Commission on Judicial
Performance, the California Supreme Court upheld the public censure of ajudge
who attached "no pregnancy" conditions to the probation of two defendants, and
while the women's appeals were pending, gave an interview to Time
magazine. 87 The New Jersey Supreme Court held a judge's appearances on
Court TV and "Geraldo Live" to be improper comment on pending actions, even
though the actions were in another jurisdiction.88 In White v. National Football
League, the Eighth Circuit found that the district judge's press interviews did
not require his recusal, but that he "would have been well advised not to opine
publicly about his role in enforcing an ongoing consent decree." 89 And in United
States v. Microsoft Corp., the D.C. Circuit removed the districtjudge on remand
because the judge's violations of the public comment rule were "deliberate,
repeated, egregious, and flagrant." 90 The judge had secretly talked to several
reporters about his views on the merits of the case just after the evidence had
closed but before he had issued his findings of fact.91
C. The "Promoting Confidence" Rule
In addition to the very specific political-activity rule, Rule 4.1, and the
pending-action rule, Rule 2.10, one of the Code's most generalized directives,
Rule 1.2, is often used to restrict extrajudicial speech. Rule 1.2 provides very
simply that "[a] judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and
shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety." 92 Because it is so
open-ended, it has served as a catchall for any untoward speech not obviously
within another rule.
In Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Boland, for example,
the judge was working on a drug court project with a number of officials from
her county when she went on a tirade.93 She complained about the intelligence
and education of otherjudges, told two of the officials they could go home, and
ultimately said, "all you African-Americans can go to hell."94 The court adopted
86 Federal Judicial Code, supra note 21, canon 3A(6).
87 Broadman, 959 P.2d at 725-26, 735.
88 Broadbeit, 683 A.2d at 548.
89 White v. Nat'l Football League, 585 F.3d 1129, 1140 (8th Cir. 2009).
9 0 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 107 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
9 1 Id. at 108.
92 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 25, r. 1.2 (references omitted).
9 3 Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Boland, 975 So. 2d 882, 884-85 (Miss.
2008).
94 1d at 885. There is a rule addressed specifically to racial bias-Rule 2.3-but it is
limited to the manifestation of such bias "in the performance of judicial duties," so it would
not apply to extrajudicial speech that betrays racism, sexism, or other bias. MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 25, r. 2.3.
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the Commission's finding that she had violated Mississippi's version of Rule
1.2.95 Similarly, in In re Lowery, a parking lot attendant approached the judge
and told him that the lot's new management was now charging judges for their
spaces.9 6 When the attendant asked the judge's name, the judge said, "N_ ,
can't you f ing read?"97 The review tribunal held that in doing so, the judge
had failed to promote confidence in the judiciary: "Judges who freely use racial
or other epithets, on or off the bench, create, at the very least, a public perception
that they will not fairly decide cases involving minorities." 9 8
IV. EXISTING FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF CODE RESTRICTIONS ON
EXTRAJUDICIAL SPEECH
To the extent that state or federal commissions seek to discipline judges for
their extrajudicial speech, those actions implicate the First Amendment. 9 And
to the extent that judges are disciplined under the Code provisions described
above-the political activity, pending action, or promoting confidence rules-
the judges are being sanctioned for the content of their speech.1 00 This content-
based nature of the ethical rules would ordinarily mean that, in the absence of
an exception for the speaker or the circumstances, the rules must undergo strict
scrutiny to survive the First Amendment.101
The commissions and courts hearing discipline cases, however, have not
necessarily agreed. For reasons that are not clear, a sizable number of
disciplining courts have completely omitted to address the constitutional
ramifications of disciplining extrajudicial speech. 102 And as will be shown
95 Boland, 975 So. 2d at 894-95 (applying Mississippi Canon 2(A)); see also Miss.
Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Osborne, 11 So. 3d 107, 114-15 (Miss. 2009) (accepting
finding that judge violated Mississippi Canon 2(A), among others, when he said, "White
folks don't praise you [African-Americans] unless you're a damn fool. Unless they think
they can use you. If you have your own mind and know what you're doing, they don't want
you around." (alteration in original)).
96In re Lowery, 999 S.W.2d 639, 646 (Tex. Review Trib. 1998).
97 Id. (first alteration added).
9 8 Id. at 656-57.
9See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (stating freedom of speech is not
without its limits and does not confer immunity from punishment for all forms of speech).
100 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 564 (2011) (stating that certain types
of speech content can be disfavored).
101 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015) ("A law that is content based
on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government's benign motive, content-
neutral justification, or lack of 'animus toward the ideas contained' in the regulated speech."
(quoting City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993))).
1 02 See, e.g.,In re Gridley, 417 So. 2d 950, 954 (Fla. 1982) (failing to address the judge's
free speech argument after finding his conduct did not violate the Code of Judicial Conduct);
In re Bonin, 378 N.E.2d 669, 684 (Mass. 1978) ("Neither the requirement nor a sanction for
the failure raises any serious question under the First or Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution or corresponding provisions of the Constitution of the Commonwealth.");
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below, the courts that have acknowledged the free-speech implications of
judicial discipline have been unable to settle on the level of protection the
Amendment offers in this context.
The courts in some cases have applied strict scrutiny to the restrictions
imposed by judicial codes. 103 In In re Sanders, the Chief Justice of the
Washington Supreme Court was charged with "failing to personally observe
high standards ofjudicial conduct and . . . diminishing public confidence in the
judiciary," and "engaging in political activity."104 Justice Sanders had attended
his own swearing-in ceremony and then walked to an antiabortion rally a few
blocks away.105 Carrying a red rose-the symbol organizers of the rally had
asked people to bring-and speaking briefly to the crowd, he said: "Nothing
is . .. more fundamental in our legal system than the preservation and protection
of innocent human life."l06
The court observed that there were "competing interests": the State's
interest in a "fair and impartial judiciary," and a judge's interest in expressing
his or her views, especially in an elective judicial system.10 7 "To achieve the
requisite balance," the court held, "the state must establish a compelling interest
and demonstrate that any restriction is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest."10 8 In the In re Sanders case, the State had compelling interests in the
integrity and appearance of impartiality of the courts, but disciplining the justice
would not satisfy strict scrutiny:
[N]othing in the record ... would permit us to construe Justice Sanders'
conduct as an express or implied promise to decide particular issues in a
particular way, or as an indication that he would be unwilling or unable to be
impartial and follow the law if faced with a case in which abortion issues were
presented.109
In re Staples, 719 P.2d 558, 561 & n.1 (Wash. 1986) (declining to decide on the validity of
the judge's constitutional claims).
103 In re Harper, 673 N.E.2d 1253, 1265 (Ohio 1996) ("[A] speaker cannot be punished
because of his or her viewpoint or message unless the restriction is necessary to promote a
compelling government interest." (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 120-21 (1991))); In re Sanders, 955 P.2d 369, 375 (Wash.
1998) ("[T]he state must establish a compelling interest and demonstrate that any restriction
is narrowly tailored to serve that interest."); In re Kaiser, 759 P.2d 392, 397-98 (Wash. 1988)
("Where political speech is at issue, disciplinary rules are subject to exacting scrutiny under
the First Amendment." (first citing In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 432 (1978); and then citing
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-39 (1963))).
104 Sanders, 955 P.2d at 372-73.
1 05 Id. at 370-71.
106 Id.
107 Id at 374.
lo8sJd at 375.
109Id at 376.
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The New Jersey Supreme Court, in In re Broadbelt, imposed a self-
described "middle-tier" scrutiny on Code restrictions of extrajudicial speech.110
The Broadbelt court decided that a judge who had appeared on Court TV,
CNBC, and the "Geraldo Live" show had violated the Code by commenting on
a variety of pending actions across the country.111 Addressing the judge's First
Amendment defense, the court acknowledged the unsettled state of the law, 112
and ultimately chose to hew closely to the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Gentile v. State Bar ofNevada,113 which addressed state regulation
of attorney speech.1 14 Ajudicial regulation can satisfy the First Amendment, the
court held in Broadbelt, if it "(1) 'further[s] an important or substantial
governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression'; and (2) is no
more restrictive than necessary to protect the governmental interest." 15 In the
case at hand, the preservation of the independence and integrity of thejudiciary,
and the maintenance of public confidence in the judiciary, were sufficient to be
considered "important" and "substantial," and the restriction imposed by the
pending-action canon was no more restrictive than necessary. 116
The court in Scott v. Flowers adopted a third approach, using the balancing
test imposed when public-employee speech is restricted.117 In Scott, a justice of
the peace brought suit against the Texas Commission on Judicial Conduct,
claiming that the commission's public reprimand of him violated the First
Amendment.it 8 Judge Scott had written an "open letter" to county officials
complaining of the county court-at-laws' practice of dismissing appeals from
lower courts such as his, and he had been sanctioned for his "insensitivity" in
oral and written communications.119
The Fifth Circuit treated Judge Scott as if he were simply a public
employee.1 20 This meant that the Supreme Court's decision in Pickering v.
Board of Educationl21 applied.1 22 So the court of appeals engaged in
Pickering's two-step inquiry: asking first whether the speech addressed a
"matter of legitimate public concern,"l 23 and if it did, "balanc[ing] the
employee's first amendment rights against the governmental employer's
countervailing interest in promoting the efficient performance of its normal
110In re Broadbelt, 683 A.2d 543, 552 (N.J. 1996) (per curiam).
IllId at 544-45, 550.
112 See id at 551.
113 Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
1 1 4 See id at 1075-76.
1 15 Broadbelt, 683 A.2d at 552 (quoting In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483, 488 (N.J. 1982)).
'
17 Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201, 210 (5th Cir. 1990).
l8Id at 204-05.
119Id. at 204.
12 0 See id at210-11.
1 2 1 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
122 Scott, 910 F.2d at 210.
12 3 Id (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571).
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functions."124 The court concluded that court processes were a matter of public
concern and that the commission had not carried its burden to show how Scott's
letter had impaired the courts' function. 125
Scott was followed by a few courts, 126 but when the Supreme Court handed
down Republican Party of Minnesota v. White in 2002-a case involving the
discipline of ajudicial candidate-the Fifth Circuit abandoned Scott and applied
strict scrutiny just as White had.1 27 In Jenevein v. Willing, the Texas
Commission on Judicial Conduct had issued a public censure to a judge for
holding a press conference in his courtroom and sending an e-mail to seventy-
six people to strike out at baseless allegations made by the plaintiff s lawyer.128
The Fifth Circuit held that in light of White, strict scrutiny applied, and would
not allow the commission to censure the judge solely for defending himself.129
As these cases show, the state and lower federal courts are uncertain about
the First Amendment analysis that should be applied to the discipline of
extrajudicial speech. The Washington court assumed, based on general First
Amendment principles, that strict scrutiny should be applied.1 30 The New Jersey
court relied on Gentile, an attorney-discipline case, for a more lenient
standard.1 31 And the Fifth Circuit relied initially on Pickering, a public-
employee discipline case, for a balancing test, 132 but later shifted to the strict
scrutiny of the judicial-candidate cases. 133 The following Part will explore these
lines of cases in order to establish the wisdom of applying Pickering in this
context.
V. DIFFERENT SUPREME COURT APPROACHES TO DISCIPLINE
BASED ON SPEECH
The Supreme Court of the last half-century has taken a broad view of First
Amendment protection and has shown a reluctance to uphold content-based
restrictions. Not only has the Court resisted recognizing new categories of
124d at 211 (citing Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987)).
1251d at 211-13.
126 E.g., In re Schenck, 870 P.2d 185, 205-06 (Or. 1994); In re Davis, 82 S.W.3d 140,
149 (Tex. Spec. Ct. Review 2002).
127 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 769-70, 774 (2002).
128 Jenevein v. Willing, 493 F.3d 551, 553-55 (5th Cir. 2007).
1291d at 560. Judge Higginbotham wrote: "To leave judges speechless, throttled for
publicly addressing abuse ofthejudicial process by practicing lawyers, ill serves the laudable
goal of promoting judicial efficiency and impartiality." Id. The Fifth Circuit did uphold the
judge's censure to the extent that it was directed at his decision to hold a press conference in
his courtroom, and his stepping out from behind the bench to address the cameras in full
robes. Id
1301n re Sanders, 955 P.2d 369, 375 (Wash. 1998).
131In re Broadbelt, 683 A.2d 543, 552 (N.J. 1996).
132 Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201, 210 (5th Cir. 1990).
133 Jenevein, 493 F.3d at 560.
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unprotected speech,1 34 but it has also held frequently that States have not met
the requirements of strict scrutiny.1 35 Subpart A-introducing the White case-
will provide an example of the latter.
With that said, the Court has identified a few contexts in which the State has
greater than ordinary authority to restrict speech.1 36 The cases covered in
Subparts B and C-Gentile and Pickering-are examples of those.
A. The Judicial Candidate Cases: Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White and Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the First Amendment
ramifications of restricting the speech of sitting judges, but has twice addressed
Code provisions limiting the speech ofjudicial candidates, in Republican Party
of Minnesota v. White' 37 and Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar.13 8 In both cases,
the Court applied strict scrutiny.1 39
In White, a Republican judicial candidate challenged Minnesota's
"announce" clause.1 40 The clause, which was based on Canon 7(B) of the 1972
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, stated that a judicial candidate or judge was
not to "announce his or her views on disputed legal or political issues."1 41 The
134 See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460,472(2010) ("Maybe there are some
categories of speech that have been historically unprotected, but have not yet been
specifically identified or discussed as such in our case law. But if so, there is no evidence
that 'depictions of animal cruelty' is among them.").
135 See, e.g., Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (holding that
California failed to prove a compelling interest-that violent video games turn children
violent-and that the statute was narrowly tailored to serve that interest).
136 See, e.g., Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239,
2245-46 (2015) ("[G]ovemment statements (and government actions and programs that take
the form of speech) do not normally trigger the First Amendment rules designed to protect
the marketplace of ideas." (citing Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 559
(2005))); Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1073 (1991) ("Even in an area far
from the courtroom and the pendency of a case, our decisions dealing with a lawyer's right
under the First Amendment to solicit business and advertise, contrary to promulgated rules
of ethics, have not suggested that lawyers are protected by the First Amendment to the same
extent as those engaged in other businesses.").
137 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).138 Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015).
1 3 9 1d. at 1665; White, 536 U.S. at 774. Justice Kennedy recognized that applying Code
provisions to sitting judges might call for a different standard. See White, 536 U.S. at 796
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Whether the rationale of Pickering v. Board ofEd .. ., 391 U.S.
563, 568 (1968), and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), could be extended to allow a
general speech restriction on sitting judges-regardless of whether they are campaigning-
in order to promote the efficient administration ofjustice, is not an issue raised here.").140 White, 536 U.S. at 769-70.
141Id. at 768 (quoting MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (West
2006)).
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parties agreed that strict scrutiny applied.1 42 The majority, speaking through
Justice Scalia, held that while there were compelling interests in preserving
judicial impartiality and the public's perception of that impartiality, the
announce clause was not narrowly tailored to advance those interests.1 4 3 The
majority did not accept the proposition that a judge could face unacceptable
pressure if a politicized judicial campaign forced the candidate to announce
stances on issues that were likely to end up before the judge on the bench.144
Justice Scalia completely rejected the idea that a judicial candidate might be
expected to adopt different conduct-depoliticized conduct-solely to honor
the profession he or she was seeking to join.1 4 5
The fact that the restrictions limited information in the context of judicial
elections was critically important to the majority.1 46 Justice Scalia wrote:
"The role that elected officials play in our society makes it all the more
imperative that they be allowed freely to express themselves on matters of
current public importance." "It is simply not the function of government to
select which issues are worth discussing or debating in the course of a political
campaign." We have never allowed the government to prohibit candidates from
communicating relevant information to voters during an election.1 4 7
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented, and Justices
Stevens and Ginsburg each filed opinions joined by all the others. 14 8 Justice
Stevens decried the majority's failure to distinguish judicial and political
candidacies. 14 9 He wrote that "every good judge is fully aware of the distinction
between the law and a personal point of view," and so a judicial candidate had
no business encouraging people to vote for him or her on the basis of that
142Id at 774.
143Id. at 775-76.
144See id at 781 ("[It suffices to say that respondents have not carried the burden
imposed by our strict-scrutiny test to establish this proposition (that campaign statements are
uniquely destructive of openmindedness) on which the validity of the announce clause
rests.").
1 45 See id at 779-80. Justice Scalia wrote:
[A judicial candidate] may say the very same thing, however, up until the very day
before he declares himself a candidate, and may say it repeatedly (until litigation is
pending) after he is elected. As a means of pursuing the objective of openmindedness
that respondents now articulate, the announce clause is so woefully underinclusive as
to render belief in that purpose a challenge to the credulous.
Id
14 6 See White, 536 U.S. at 781-82.
1471d. (citations omitted) (first quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 395 (1962); and
then quoting Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982)).
14 8 1d. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
1 49 1d. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("By obscuring the fundamental distinction
between campaigns for the judiciary and the political branches ... the Court defies any
sensible notion of the judicial office and the importance of impartiality in that context.").
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"personal point of view."150 Stevens wrote, "to the extent that such statements
seek to enhance the popularity of [a] candidate by indicating how he would rule
in specific cases if elected, they evidence a lack offitness for the office."' 5 '
Justice Ginsburg elaborated on the distinction between the judicial and
political roles.1 52 She quoted Justice Scalia himself for the proposition that
judges are actually supposed to "stand[] up to what is generally supreme in a
democracy: the popular will."1 53 Because of this, she wrote, "the Court's
unrelenting reliance on decisions involving contests for legislative and
executive posts is manifestly out of place," 54 and the Court should allow states
to limit judicial campaign speech "by measures impermissible in elections for
political office."' 5 5
1501d at 798 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151Id (emphasis added).
152 White, 536 U.S. at 803-09 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
1 53 Id at 804 (quoting Antonin Scalia, The Rule ofLaw as a Law ofRules, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1175, 1180 (1989)).
154_1d at 806.
155Id. at 807. Justice Ginsburg challenged Justice Scalia for belittling the distinction
between statements made before a judicial candidacy and those made after. She noted that
he had drawn precisely such a distinction when he appeared before the Senate in connection
with his confirmation. Id at 818 n.4. She quoted then-Judge Scalia as saying:
Let us assume that I have people arguing before me to do it or not to do it. I think it is
quite a thing to be arguing to somebody who you know has made a representation in the
course of his confirmation hearings, and that is, by way of condition to his being
confirmed, that he will do this or do that. I think I would be in a very bad position to
adjudicate the case without being accused of having a less than impartial view of the
matter.
Id (quoting 13 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON
SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 1916-1986: ANTONIN SCALIA 37 (Roy M. Mersky & J.
Myron Jacobstein eds., 1989))). She also quoted then-Justice Rehnquist acknowledging why
judicial nominees should refrain from political statements:
[[Olne must] distinguish quite sharply between a public statement made prior to
nomination for the bench, on the one hand, and a public statement made by a nominee
to the bench. For the latter to express any but the most general observation about the
law would suggest that, in order to obtain favorable consideration of his nomination, he
deliberately was announcing in advance, without benefit of judicial oath, briefs, or
argument, how he would decide a particular question that might come before him as a
judge.
Id at 819 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 836 n.5 (1972)).
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In Williams-Yulee, the Florida Bar imposed sanctions on judicial candidate
Yuleel 56 after she mailed a letter seeking funds for her judicial campaign.15 7
The letter violated Florida's Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7C(l), which
provided that "[a] candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office
that is filled by public election between competing candidates shall not
personally solicit campaign funds." 5 8 The Florida Supreme Court upheld the
Code provision against Yulee's First Amendment challenge, and the Supreme
Court affirmed. 15 9
The Florida Bar and several amici urged the Court to adopt a standard akin
to intermediate scrutiny for evaluating Canon 7C(l). 160 Borrowing from
McConnell v. FEC,16 1 they argued that the bar need only show that Canon 7C(1)
was "closely drawn" to match a "sufficiently important interest."1 62 Chief
Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, rejected the argument with little pause:
As we have long recognized, speech about public issues and the qualifications
of candidates for elected office [which the fundraising letter included]
commands the highest level of First Amendment protection. Indeed, in our only
prior case concerning speech restrictions on a candidate for judicial office, this
Court and both parties assumed that strict scrutiny applied. 163
The Court went on to hold that the Florida rule was "one of the rare cases
in which a speech restriction withstands strict scrutiny." Florida's interests in
protecting the integrity of the judiciary and maintaining the public's confidence
in an impartial judiciary were sufficiently compelling: "public perception of
judicial integrity is 'a state interest of the highest order."' 1 65 Likewise, the canon
was narrowly tailored to advance those interests. 166 By prohibiting personal
solicitation, the canon eliminated the appearance of justice for sale.1 6 7 The
lawyers and litigants who might feel they had no choice in a personal solicitation
could instead choose whether to support a given judge. 168 And the canon
156 The Court's opinion states that the Petitioner "refers to herself as" Yulee. Williams-
Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1663 (2015).
1 57 Id. Yulee was an attorney, and the Florida Bar sanctioned her under Florida Bar Rule
4-8.2(b), which required judicial candidates to comply with the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Id at 1663-64.
1581d at 1663.
1 59 1d at 1664, 1673.
1601d. at 1665.
161 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 136 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365-66 (2010).
162 Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1665.
1 63 See id (first citing Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223
(1989); and then citing Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774 (2002)).
164Id. at 1666.
1 65 Id (quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 889 (2009)).
166 Id
1 6 7 See id
168 Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1667-68.
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allowed judicial candidates to raise money-just through committees rather than
by personal solicitation-without otherwise restricting their communications
with voters. 169
B. The Attorney Discipline Case: Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada
The petitioner in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada was a criminal defense
attorney who had been disciplined by the Nevada Bar for a press conference he
held hours after his client was indicted, during which the attorney suggested that
the investigating detective was the actual perpetrator.17 0 The attorney was said
to have violated Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177(1), which prohibited an
attorney from making "an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person
would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding." 171 The
disciplinary board found that the attorney violated the rule, and the Nevada
Supreme Court affirmed.1 72
The Nevada decision was ultimately overturned, when a majority of the
Supreme Court found that subsection 3 of the rule, a safe-harbor provision on
which the attorney had relied in crafting his statement, was void for
vagueness.1 73 A different majority, however, went on to address the merits of
the state bar's arguments, and held that rule 177(1) did not violate the First
Amendment. 174 The attorney had argued that the rule was unconstitutional
insofar as it punished speech that did not present a "clear and present danger"
of prejudicing the trial, the only showing that would allow regulation of the
press.1 75 In an opinion of the Court for that majority, Justice Rehnquist wrote:
The question we must answer in this case is whether a lawyer ... may insist
on the same standard before he is disciplined for public pronouncements about
the case, or whether the State instead may penalize that sort of speech upon a
lesser showing.
Even in an area far from the courtroom and the pendency of a case, our
decisions dealing with a lawyer's right under the First Amendment to solicit
business and advertise, contrary to promulgated rules of ethics, have not
suggested that lawyers are protected by the First Amendment to the same extent
as those engaged in other businesses. In each of these cases, we engaged in a
1691d at 1672.
170 Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1033, 1045 (1991).
I 71 Id. at 1033.
172 Id
173Id. at 1048-49, 1058.
174Id. at 1075.
175Id at 1069.
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balancing process, weighing the State's interest in the regulation of a
specialized profession against a lawyer's First Amendment interest in the kind
of speech that was at issue....
We think that the quoted statements ... rather plainly indicate that the
speech of lawyers representing clients in pending cases may be regulated under
a less demanding standard than that established for regulation of the
press ... .176
C. The Public Employee Discipline Cases: Pickering v. Board of
Education
In Pickering v. Board ofEducation, the Supreme Court held expressly that
public employees have a First Amendment right to speak on matters of public
concern. 177 The Court did not subject the employer's restrictions to strict
scrutiny, however. 178 Whether an employee's speech is protected, the Court
held, turns on "a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen,
in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as
an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees."l 79
In the years since Pickering, the Court has refined its balancing test in a
number of ways. The Court made clear in Connick v. Myers that First
Amendment protection extended only to employee statements of public
concern, not to statements addressing private employment matters.180 Under
Connick, government officials enjoy "wide latitude" when "employee
expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political,
social, or other concern." 18 1 Thus, Myers's office questionnaire-addressing
morale, the office transfer policy, the loss of confidence in supervisors, and the
need for a grievance committee in the New Orleans district attorney's office-
was not protected.1 82
176 Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1071-74 (first citing Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350
(1977); then citing Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91
(1990); then citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); then citing In re
Cohen, 166 N.E.2d 672, 675 (N.Y. 1960), cert. granted, 363 U.S. 810 (1960); then citing In
re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959); and then citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966)).
177 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (first citing Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); then citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); and
then citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967)).
178 See id ("[T]he State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its
employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of
the speech of the citizenry in general.").
179 Id
180 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
181 Id
1 82 Id at 149. The Court held that one of the questions on the questionnaire-that
relating to alleged "pressure[] to work in political campaigns"-did address a matter of
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The Court also declined to extend protection to statements employees make
as a part of their official duties, even if the statements involve matters of public
concern. In Garcetti v. Ceballos, a deputy district attorney had written two
internal memos calling into question a warrant affiant's credibility, and the
deputy was fired after a criminal defendant called him to testify about the
warrant. 183 Emphasizing its desire not to "constitutionalize the employee
grievance," 84 and Pickering's purpose of protecting the employee as citizen
rather than as employee, the majority held that "when public employees make
statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as
citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate
their communications from employer discipline." 85
In other cases, the Court elaborated on the two parts of the Pickering
balancing test: the concept of "public concern" and the factors that should
inform a holding of workplace disruption. In City of San Diego v. Roe, a San
Diego police officer posted online a video of himself stripping off his uniform
and masturbating.1 86 When he refused to take the video down, he was fired.187
The Supreme Court held that Roe's video was not even subject to Pickering
balancing because it did not involve a matter of public concern.' 8 8 To determine
whether a statement involves a matter of public concern, the Court wrote:
Connick . .. directs courts to examine the 'content, form, and context of a given
statement, as revealed by the whole record' in assessing whether an employee's
speech addresses a matter of public concern.. .. [T]he standard for
determining whether expression is of public concern is the same standard used
to determine whether a common-law action for invasion of privacy is present[,
public concern, and so it performed Pickering balancing with respect to that question. Id at
149-50. The Court found in favor of the employer in the balancing:
When close working relationships are essential to fulfilling public responsibilities, a
wide degree of deference to the employer's judgment is appropriate. ... [Wie do not
see the necessity for an employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the
disruption of the office and the destruction of working relationships is manifest before
taking action.
Id at 151-52.183 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 414-15 (2006).
184Id at 420 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 154).
1 8 5 Id at 421. The statements that are unprotected are ones that are routinely made in the
course of doing one's job. In Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2375-76 (2014), the Court
addressed the firing of a program director who learned that a state representative was on the
program's payroll in name only, fired the representative, and ultimately became a witness in
the representative's federal criminal trial. The Court held that the firing violated the First
Amendment even though the testimony related to the director's job duties: "The critical
question under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of
the employee's duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties." Id at 2379.
18 City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 78 (2004) (per curiam).
187_d at 78-79.
188Id at 84.
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as established in Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn and Time, Inc. v. Hill].. .. [P]ublic
concern is something that is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a
subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public at the time of
publication. 189
In Rankin v. McPherson, the Court performed Pickering balancing and
identified several factors that should be considered with respect to workplace
disruption, the employer's side of the scale. 190 The employee in Rankin was a
nineteen-year-old woman working as a data entry clerk in a back room at the
Harris County Constable's office. 19 1 When the news reported the attempt to
assassinate President Reagan, she turned to her coworker (and as it turned out,
boyfriend) and said, "[I]f they go for him again, I hope they get him."1 92 A
deputy reported her, and she was fired.1 9 3
The Rankin majority held that the woman's statement involved a matter of
public concern, and thus Pickering balancing was appropriate.1 94
In performing the balancing, the statement will not be considered in a
vacuum; the manner, time, and place of the employee's expression are relevant,
as is the context in which the dispute arose. We have previously recognized as
pertinent considerations whether the statement impairs discipline by superiors
or harmony among co-workers, has a detrimental impact on close working
relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or
impedes the performance of the speaker's duties or interferes with the regular
operation of the enterprise.1 9 5
Because the woman's statement was made privately, such that no member
of the public likely heard her, and there was no evidence that it interfered with
the efficient functioning of the office, the Court found that her discharge
violated the First Amendment. 196 The Court rejected the constable's argument
that she was "not suitable" for a law enforcement job: "We cannot believe that
every employee .. . ,whether computer operator, electrician, or file clerk, is
equally required, on pain of discharge, to avoid any statement susceptible of
being interpreted by the Constable as an indication that the employee may be
unworthy of employment in his law enforcement agency."1 9 7
19id at 83-84 (first citing Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); and then
citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967)).
1 90 Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388, 391 (1987).
1 9 1Id. at 380-81.
192Id at 381.
1 93 Id at 381-82.
194Id at 388.
1951d. (citations omitted) (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 570-73
(1968)).
196Rankin, 483 U.S. at 392.
197Id at 391.
3052018]
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
Finally, and importantly for purposes here, in United States v. National
Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) the Supreme Court addressed a challenge
to a statute that prohibited public employees from receiving compensation for
non-work-related speeches.1 98 The Court considered Pickering balancing the
appropriate test, but noted that as an ex ante restriction, the government's burden
was heavier than usual:
The widespread impact of the honoraria ban, however, gives rise to far more
serious concerns than could any single supervisory decision. In addition, unlike
an adverse action taken in response to actual speech, this ban chills potential
speech before it happens. For these reasons, the Government's burden is greater
with respect to this statutory restriction on expression than with respect to an
isolated disciplinary action. 19
Ultimately, the Court held that the "speculative benefits" the honoraria ban
might provide to the efficiency of the federal workplace were completely
inadequate to justify the ban. 20 0
VI. A PICKERING ANALYSIS APPROPRIATE TO SITTING JUDGES
In a society with communication devices always within reach, judges have
the opportunity more than ever to engage in extrajudicial speech. Several
developments suggest that extrajudicial speech may become more common: the
prevalence and politicization of judicial elections at the state level, 201 the
polarity of the electorate generally,202 and the ease with which statements may
be made on social media or blogs. At the same time, the needs of the judiciary
as an institution remain constant. The judicial system continues to depend on
independent, impartial judges and the people's collective belief that judges are
independent and impartial. Hence, there is a real need for refined, workable
ethics codes that protect the judiciary's reputation and yet allow judges the
breathing room the First Amendment requires.
A. The Inappropriateness of Strict Scrutiny
In deciding how to analyze extrajudicial speech provisions under the First
Amendment, one would turn first to the Supreme Court's decisions in
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White203 and Williams-Yulee v. Florida
198 United States v. Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 457 (1995).
199Id. at 468 (first citing City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 54-55 (1994); and then
citing Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)).
200 Id. at 477.20 1 See Lynne H. Rambo, High Court Pretense, Lower Court Candor: Judicial
Impartiality After Caperton v. Massey Coal Co., 13 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J.
441, 459-69 (2015).
202 Political Polarization in the American Public, supra note 31.
203 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
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Bar.204 Both cases involved extrajudicial speech provisions drawn from the
Model Rules of Judicial Conduct and applied to judicial candidates. 205 In both
cases, the State argued that it had interests in preserving impartiality and the
appearance of impartiality. 206 In both cases, the Court applied strict scrutiny.207
Nonetheless, the precedential value of the cases is limited. First, both
involved judicial candidates rather than sitting judges, and there is good reason
to treat those two groups separately with respect to Code provisions. 208 A sitting
judge has made a conscious decision to accept the ethical constraints placed on
her in a way that someone merely running for office has not. Second, in neither
case did the Court focus on whether strict scrutiny should be applied to ethical
code provisions generally. In White, the parties stipulated to the application of
strict scrutiny, and the Court simply accepted that level of analysis. 209 In
Williams-Yulee, the Court emphasized that speech on public issues and
candidate qualifications-i.e., electoral speech-deserved the highest
protection. 210 In the ordinary discipline of judges, electoral speech is unlikely
to be involved.
The approach that the Court took toward practicing lawyers in Gentile v.
State Bar ofNevada seems more appropriate to the discipline of sitting judges.
In the face of Gentile's express argument that the Nevada Bar regulations should
be subjected to strict scrutiny-i.e., a clear-and-present-danger test-the
Supreme Court opted for a balancing analysis. 2 11 Ultimately, it held for the State
on this point because the State's interest in "regulati[ng] . . . a specialized
profession" outweighed the lawyer's interest in speaking.212
Indeed, if the State has an interest in regulating the profession of lawyers, it
has an even greater interest in regulating the government institution that is the
judiciary. Strict scrutiny is important to apply when the State intermittently
restricts the speech of individual citizens, but as the Court said in Connick v.
Myers, "government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their
offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First
Amendment." 2 13 Requiring that every ethics rule to which a sitting judge is
204 Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015).
205 See Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1662-63; White, 536 U.S. at 768.
206 See Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1666; White, 536 U.S. at 775.
207 See Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1666; White, 536 U.S. at 781. These similarities
caused the Fifth Circuit to abandon its own precedent and begin applying strict scrutiny to
any Code speech provision, whether candidate or sittingjudge. Jenevein v. Willing, 493 F.3d
551, 558 (5th Cir. 2007).
208 See Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1663; White, 536 U.S. at 769.
209 White, 536 U.S. at 774.
210 Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1665 ("As we have long recognized, speech about
public issues and the qualifications of candidates for elected office commands the highest
level of First Amendment protection." (citing Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489
U.S. 214, 223 (1989))).
211 Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1069, 1075 (1991).
212Id at 1073-75.
2 13 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
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subject be narrowly tailored to its end would place an extraordinary burden on
the State. Further, it would be incongruous to apply Gentile's balancing test to
the ethical rules governing lawyers and yet a different, stricter test to the ethical
rules governing judges.
B. Adapting the Pickering Framework to the Judicial Discipline Context
For these reasons-conferring sufficient latitude on the State to manage the
judiciary and maintaining consistency with Gentile's balancing approach-it
seems most appropriate to adopt the Pickering framework for evaluating
extrajudicial speech. The Pickering doctrine arose in the context of public-
employee speech,2 14 and although judges are not exactly "rank and file"
employees, they are indeed public employees. Moreover, as the summary above
shows, 215 the Court has heard so many cases invoking the doctrine that it has
developed an extensive framework for addressing different situations.
Under Pickering, an employee claiming First Amendment protection faces
a threshold burden.216 An employee disciplined or fired for something the
employee said can claim the benefit of the First Amendment only if (1) the
speech involved a matter of public concern, 217 and (2) the speech was not the
product of a task within the employee's official duties. 218 If both of these are
the case, then the court weighs "the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through
its employees." 219 If the speech does not involve a matter of public concern,
then it is unprotected and any discipline decision stands. 220 If the speech is a
product of the employee's official duties, it is not the "citizen" speech for which
the First Amendment protection was extended, and any discipline decision
stands.22 1
These conditions are well-suited to the context of discipline for extrajudicial
speech. If First Amendment protection is not extended to extrajudicial speech
on matters of private concern, that immediately excludes a substantial portion
of the speech for which judges are disciplined, particularly under Rule 1.2: for
example, racist and sexist language, and private disputes.222 Further, with
judges, whether their speech was a product of their official duties should be a
relatively easy question: the speech was either part of one of their assigned
proceedings or it was not.
2 14 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968).215 See supra notes 177-200 and accompanying text.
216See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
217See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
21 See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
219 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
220 See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
221See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
222 See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
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The balancing test also adapts well, although the State's interest side of the
scale needs expansion. Pickering directs that the courts weigh the speaker's
interest-the judge's interest-against the State's interest "in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees." 22 3 In
Rankin v. McPherson, the Court expounded upon the State's interest, holding
that the court should consider "whether the statement impairs discipline by
superiors or harmony among co-workers, has a detrimental impact on close
working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary,
or impedes the performance of the speaker's duties or interferes with the regular
operation of the enterprise." 224 In thejudicial setting, these concerns (depending
on the interpretation of the last two) are not usually the driving force behind the
discipline. 225 Most discipline for extrajudicial speech is levied because thejudge
has threatened either the actual or the perceived independence, integrity, or
impartiality of the court.226 Hence, in applying Pickering balancing to
extrajudicial speech, the State's interest should be expanded to include
protecting the judicial institution.
Finally, applying Pickering in the extrajudicial speech context, where
discipline is based on existing ethical codes, requires incorporating the Supreme
Court's decision in NTEU. The Court there held that an ex ante restriction on
speech chills employee speech in a way that an ad hoc employment action does
not, and so the government's burden in the balancing test is heavier. 227 The
ethical codes governing extrajudicial speech are also ex ante restrictions, so state
and federal disciplinary bodies need to be prepared to carry a substantial burden.
C. Presumptions for the State
With that said, the NTEU Court acknowledged that it would "normally
accord a stronger presumption of validity to a congressional judgment than to
an individual executive's disciplinary action." 22 8 It did not do so, Justice
Stevens wrote, because not only was the ban ex ante, but it swept so widely that
it did not warrant the presumption. 229
The judicial ethical codes in place around the country differ markedly from
the honorarium ban in NTEU. The NTEU ban was adopted to prevent
government employees (primarily members of Congress) from doing the
bidding of special interests while being paid for "speeches" and
223 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
224 Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987) (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570-
73). 225 See supra notes 68-98 and accompanying text.
226 See supra notes 68-98 and accompanying text.
227 See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
228 United States v. Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 468 (1995) (citing
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 671 & n.2 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment)).
229 Id
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"appearances." 230 Yet the ban was applied to all speeches by all employees,
without any evidence that any civil servants under GS-16 (the general base pay
schedule for federal public employees) had ever engaged in such misconduct.23 1
Little effort was made to distinguish between the speech that triggered the
concern and the speech that did not.2 32
In contrast, the judicial codes are the product of decades of thoughtful
consideration. The Canons of Judicial Ethics were adopted in 1924, and were
followed by versions of the ABA's Model Code of Judicial Conduct in 1972,
1990, and 2007.233 Today, every state has adopted one of these versions.234 With
each version, the Committee has made efforts to limit the restraints on judges to
only those necessary for judicial "independence, integrity and impartiality." 235
Because that has been the case, most of the rules give very specific guidance.
Two of the rules with respect to extrajudicial speech are an example. Rule
4.1-the "political activity rule"-has thirteen parts, all of which are very
specific about the prohibited activity. 236 (The rule was amended in 2003 to
remove the clause stricken in 2002 in Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White.237) Rule 2.10-the "pending action rule"-is likewise well-defined,
expressly requiring a causal effect between the extrajudicial speech and the
feared outcome. 238
The exception is Rule 1.2, the "promoting confidence rule." 239 Rule 1.2 is
a generalized principle at the beginning of the Code, and as a disciplinary matter,
it operates as a catchall for conduct and speech that does not fit elsewhere. 240
Although the rule is perhaps a necessary evil, it sweeps broadly, gives little
notice of what is prohibited, and could be abused by an unscrupulous
disciplinary body.241
230_Id at 457-59.
231 Id. at 459, 472.
232 See id at 472-74.23 3 See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
234See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.2 3 5 See CHARLES E. GEYH & W. WILLIAM HODES, AM. BAR Ass'N, REPORTERS' NoTEs
TO THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, at vii-ix (2009) (describing the evolution of the
Code from the 1924 Canons to the 2007 version); id at viii ("Over the course of three and
one half years, the Commission conducted a comprehensive examination of the standards for
the ethical conduct ofjudges and judicial candidates that promote the independence, integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary.").
23 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
2 37 GEYH & HODES, supra note 235, at 92 ("Canon 4 of the 2007 Code is derived from
Canon 5 of the 1990 Code, as amended in 1997, 1999, and 2003-the last time in response
to the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536
U.S. 765 (2002)." (references omitted)); see White, 536 U.S. at 787.2 38 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
239 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 25, r. 1.2.2 40 See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
241 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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In applying the Pickering framework to extrajudicial speech, the courts
should accord the presumption of validity acknowledged in NTEUto the State's
side of the scale when the basis for the discipline is Rule 4.1 or 2.10. The
"political activity rule" is refined, specifically defined, and tied to the State's
interest in preserving the independence and impartiality of the judiciary and the
public's confidence in that independence and impartiality. 242 To the extent that
judges engage in the rough and tumble of party politics, it is somewhat less
likely that they will be independent and impartial, and substantially less likely
that the people will see them that way.24 3 The "pending action rule" is similarly
specific: judges may not make public comments about any pending or
impending action if the comments "might reasonably be expected to affect the
outcome or impair the fairness of a matter pending or impending in any court,
or make any nonpublic statement that might substantially interfere with a fair
trial or hearing." 244 The goal is to avoid any appearance that a case has been
prejudged, that judges are trying to influence one another, or that a judge
deciding differently is "wrong."245
Rule 1.2, the "promoting confidence rule," 246 should be afforded no such
presumption. As was the case in NTEU,2 4 7 the rule is an ex ante prohibition and
sweeps very broadly, thereby acting as a chill to extrajudicial speech and setting
up the potential for selective prosecution. When the Pickering balance is
undertaken, the State should bear a heavy burden to prove that the judge caused
confidence in the judiciary to drop.
D. A Case Study: Applying the Model Code and Pickering to Judge
Kopf's Remarks
To understand how the Pickering doctrine might be applied to extrajudicial
speech, the actions of Senior United States District Judge Richard G. Kopf
provide an interesting case study. 248
1. Judge Kopfs Remarks
Judge Kopf, while still hearing cases regularly, maintained a blog.249 in one
post, he remarked about a woman who regularly appeared before him: "She is
242 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 25, r. 4.1, cmts. 1, 3.
243 See id.
244Id. r. 2.10(A).
245 See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
246 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 25, r. 1.2.
24 7 See United States v. Nat'1 Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 468 (1995).
248 Judge Kopf serves on the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska.
Judges' Information, U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR DISTRICT NEB.,
http://www.ned.uscourts.gov/attomey/judges-infornation [https/perma.cc/7DZ2-B6WD].
249 See Richard George Kopf, The Who, the Why, and the Title of This Blog, HERCULES
& UMPIRE, https//herculesandtheumpire.com/the-who-and-why-of-this-blog/ [https.//perma
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brilliant, she writes well, she speaks eloquently, she is zealous but not overly so,
she is always prepared, she treats others, including her opponents, with civility
and respect, she wears very short skirts and shows lots of her ample chest. I
especially appreciate the last two attributes." 250 In another post, the judge
complained about the Supreme Court's decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc.2 5 1 He wrote: "the Court is now causing more harm (division) to our
democracy than good by deciding hot button cases that the Court has the power
to avoid. As the kids say, it is time for the Court to stfu . . . 252 Most recently,
.cc/WQY6-4GU8]. Judge Kopf is by no means the only judge to maintain a blog, or even the
most famous, or even the only one to make controversial statements. Judge Richard A.
Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit operated a blog with
fellow University of Chicago economist Gary S. Becker from December 2004 through May
2014, when Professor Becker passed away. See Richard A. Posner, Farewell, BECKER-
POSNER BLOG (May 10, 2014), http//www.becker-posner-blog.com/2014/05/index.html [https://
permacc/7KKR-CANP]. Judge Posner now writes a blog at The Atlantic. See Richard A.
Posner, ATLANTIC, https://www.theatlantic.com/author/richard-a-posner/ [https//perma.c/RLC5
-XY4Z]. Posner has written thirty-eight books as well, all of them since he took the bench in
1981. See Richard A. Posner, UNiv. CHI., http://home.uchicago.edu/-rposner/
[https://perma.cc/JX7D-UHRX]. One of his books was, quite controversially, about
President Bill Clinton's impeachment. RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE
INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON (1999); see Monroe H.
Freedman, Free Speech for Judges: A Commentary on Lubet et al. v. Posner, CT. REV.,
Winter 2001, at 4, 4 (responding to arguments that Posner unethically commented on a
pending or impending action). One of Judge Posner's most recent controversial comments
is this:
I think the Supreme Court is at a nadir. The justices are far too uniform in background,
and I don't think there are any real stars among them; the last real star, Robert Jackson,
died more than 60 years ago. I regard the posthumous encomia for Scalia as absurd.
Especially those of Harvard Law School Dean Martha Minow and Justice Elena Kagan.
And on another note about academia and practical law, I see absolutely no value
to a judge of spending decades, years, months, weeks, day, hours, minutes, or seconds
studying the Constitution, the history of its enactment, its amendments, and its
implementation (across the centuries-well, just a little more than two centuries, and of
course less for many of the amendments).
Richard A. Posner, Entry 9: The Academy Is Out oflts Depth, SLATE: Sup. CT. BREAKFAST
TABLE (June 24,2016), http://www.slate.com/articles/news andolitics/the_breakfast tablelfeat
ures/2016/supreme court breakfast table for june_2016/law school_professorsneedmorepra
ctical experience.html [https://permacc/C28A-EMR3]. For a list of several other judges who
blog, see Robert Ambrogi, A Quick Survey ofBlogs Written by Judges, LAWSrrEs (May 13,
2013), http://www.lawsitesblog.com/2013/04/a-quick-survey-of-blogs-written-by-judges.html
[https://perma.cc/65VY-W2HR].
2 5 0 RGK, On Being a Dirty Old Man and How Young Women Lawyers Dress, HERCULES
& UMPIRE (Mar. 25, 2014), https/A/herculesandtheumpire.com/2014/03/25/on-being-a-irty-old-
man-and-how-young-women-lawyers-dress/ [https-//perma.cc/QZP8-MKSA].
251 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).252 RGK, Remembering Alexander Bickel's Passive Virtues and the Hobby Lobby Cases,
HERCULES & UMPIRE (July 5, 2014), httpsi//herculesandtheumpire.com/2O
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Judge Kopf declared presidential candidate Senator Ted Cruz "unfit" for office
because Cruz called for a constitutional amendment requiring Supreme Court
Justices to have retention elections. 253
2. Applying the Model Code to Judge Kopf's Remarks
If we were to apply the Model Code to Judge Kopf254-hypothetically only,
of course, because as a federal judge, Judge Kopf is subject only to the Code of
Conduct of United States Judges, and it is not mandatory-he could be brought
up on charges of several violations. The first statement-the "cleavage
remark"-could be seen to violate Rule 1.2, which requires judges to "act at all
times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence,
integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and .. . avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety." 255 Plainly, an extrajudicial, public statement
focusing on the physical appearance of a female lawyer who regularly appears
before the judge-and so most likely is identifiable-does not promote
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and does not avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety. It suggests that women litigants
and lawyers will not be taken seriously, and that the judge's attention may not
be on the merits whenever an attractive woman is in the room.
The second statement-the "stfu remark"-could also be seen as violating
Rule 1.2, as well as, potentially, Rule 2.10(A), which reads: "A judge shall not
make any public statement that might reasonably be expected to affect the
outcome or impair the fairness of a matter pending or impending in any
court... . ."256 Again, an extrajudicial public statement that the Supreme Court
of the United States-the highest court in the land-should "shut the fuck up"
most likely does not promote confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary or avoid impropriety or the appearance thereof.257 Further, the judge
made the statement in July 2014, only five days after the Hobby Lobby decision,
while that case and other related cases were pending.258 It is not very likely,
4/07/05/remembering-alexander-bickels-passive-virtues-and-the-hobby-lobby-cases/ [https://perma
.cc/UP42-ZK4C].2 5 3 RGK, Senator Ted Cruz Is Not Fit To Be President, HERCULES & UMPIRE (July 6,
2015), https://herculesandtheumpire.com/2015/07/06/senator-ted-cruz-is-not-fit-to-be-president/
[https//perma.cclNJV3-A9LN].
254 The Model Code is being used here simply because it is more common among the
states.
255 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 25, r. 1.2 (references omitted).
256 Id r. 2.10(A) (references omitted).
257 See id. r. 1.2; RGK, supra note 252.
258 There were several cases brought alleging that the accommodation the Department
of Health and Human Services offered nonprofit religious organization employers-which
required the employers to give notice of their objection to providing contraception
coverage-violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. E.g., Zubik v. Burwell, 136
S. Ct. 1557, 1559 (2016). At the time that Hobby Lobby was decided, these cases were in the
pipeline in the Third, Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits. See id at 1560.
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however, that a court would find his "stfu" remark "reasonably ... expected to
affect the outcome" of the pending or impending cases.259
The third statement-the "unfitness remark"-flatly violates Rule 4.1(3),
which forbids ajudge to "publicly endorse or oppose a candidate for any public
office." 260 Senator Cruz was a candidate for President.261 Certainly, Judge
Kopf's description of him as unfit for office would qualify as opposing the
Senator's candidacy.
3. The Pickering Balance
With these Code violations identified, the next question is whether the
judge's statements were on matters of public concern such that they trigger First
Amendment balancing under Pickering. (Under this scenario, there is no need
to address whether the statements were products of the judge's official duties.
They clearly were not.)
Almost certainly, a court would find that the cleavage remark did not
involve a matter of public concern. San Diego v. Roe describes a public concern
as a topic of "legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and
of value and concern to the public." 262 The wardrobe and figure of a litigator in
Judge Kopf s courtroom, and his attraction to that, are not a legitimate news
interest. And because his comments are not on a matter of public concern, he
has no First Amendment protection from discipline under Rule 1.2.
The "stfu" remark most likely does involve a matter of public concern.
Judge Kopf s statement came at the end of a discussion of the Supreme Court's
recent decision in the Hobby Lobby case.263 The judge complained in the post
that the Hobby Lobby case was highly controversial, and thus the wiser thing
would have been for the Court to decline certiorari jurisdiction. 264 Precisely
because the decision was so controversial, it would seem to be a matter of public
concern.
Under the Pickering doctrine, the next step would be to identify Judge
Kopf s interest, "as a citizen," in commenting on the matter, and weigh it against
the interest of the federal courts, as the employer, in "promoting the efficiency
of the public services it performs." 265 Rankin v. McPherson directs that the
2 5 9 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 25, r. 2.10; RGK, supra note
252.
260 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 25, r. 4.1 (A)(3).2 6 1 RGK, supra note 253.
262 City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83-84 (2004) (per curiam).2 63 RGK, supra note 252.2 64 1d. ("To the average person, the result looks stupid and smells worse.... Had the
Court sat on the sidelines, I don't think any significant harm would have occurred. The most
likely result is that one or more of the political branches of government would have worked
something out."). There is serious irony in the fact that Judge Kopf spoke publicly in such a
questionable fashion while simultaneously criticizing the Supreme Court for leaving such a
bad impression on people.
265 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
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balance not be conducted in a vacuum.266 On the speaker's side, the court should
consider "the manner, time, and place of the ... expression." 267 On the State's
side, the court should consider "whether the statement impairs discipline by
superiors or harmony among co-workers, has a detrimental impact on close
working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary,
or impedes the performance of the speaker's duties or interferes with the regular
operation of the enterprise." 268 And under the analysis proposed here, the court
should consider all of the interests put forth by the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct.
Judge Kopf began blogging in February 2013.269 At that time, he said, "I
am very interested in the role of judges and particularly the role of federal trial
judges. So, that is what I will write about . "270 His "stfu" remark came two
and a half years later, as part of a heartfelt essay objecting that the Supreme
Court had unnecessarily been taking on controversial cases, and that that served
only to heighten the public's impression that the Court was a political body.271
Like the letter to the editor written by the schoolteacher in Pickering,272 the
judge was commenting on developments in his field, and he presumably hoped
to influence the Court by doing so. A court would have to conclude that he had
a strong interest as a citizen in commenting as he did.
Were Judge Kopf to face discipline under Rule 1.2, the State would cite its
interest in promoting confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the courts.273
It would argue that the judicial system cannot work unless people trust that the
system's outcomes are legally sound even when they do not like them.274 It
would also argue that the judge's remark diminished public confidence in the
judiciary-both the Supreme Court and Judge Kopf-because the judge was so
willing to speak disrespectfully and profanely.
It is hard to say how a court weighing the competing interests would decide.
Judge Kopf undoubtedly has a strong citizen's interest in expressing his
2 66 Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987).
267Id. at 388.2 68 [d
2 69 See Kopf, supra note 249.
2 70 Id
271 RGK, supra note 252.
2 72 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968).
273 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 25, r. 1.2.
274 The Court in Williams-Yulee had much to say about the importance of the State's
interest in public perception:
We have recognized the "vital state interest" in safeguarding "public confidence in the
fairness and integrity of the nation's elected judges.". . . The judiciary's authority
therefore depends in large measure on the public's willingness to respect and follow its
decisions.... It follows that public perception ofjudicial integrity is "a state interest of
the highest order."
Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1666 (2015) (quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 889 (2009)).
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displeasure with the Supreme Court. But the State has a strong interest in
promoting confidence in the courts that is substantially contravened by the
judge's objection. A court might also be affected by the form in which Judge
Kopf spoke: the message could certainly have been delivered in a different
way.275 Although the issue is a close one, and it is important not to allow the
"promoting confidence rule" to be used too broadly, the author would find that
the balance tips for the State.276
Finally, Judge Kopfs unfitness remark definitely involved a matter of
public concern. Judge Kopf was speaking about a candidate for the presidency.
Who was to be elected after President Barack Obama left office was one of the
most significant, if not the most significant news item from mid-2015 through
the election in November 2016.277 Because he spoke on a matter of public
concern, Judge Kopf's interest in speaking as a citizen must be weighed against
the State's interest in Rule 4.1, prohibiting judges from endorsing or opposing
political candidates. 278
Much as is the case with Judge Kopf's "stfu" remark, the judge had a strong
interest as a citizen in making his unfitness remark about Senator Cruz. There
are few matters as to which a citizen might want to convince others more than
the election of the president. And Judge Kopf devoted an entire blog post to his
275 It was not nearly as necessary for Judge Kopf to use the word "fuck" as it was for the
defendant in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16, 26 (1971) (overturning defendant's
conviction for disturbing the peace based on wearing a jacket with "Fuck the Draft" on the
back).
276 The story of how Judge Kopf came to discontinue his blog speaks to the State's
interest in maintaining confidence in the courts. According to Judge Kopf himself:
I am pulling the plug because I learned a couple of hours ago about a discussion held at
a retreat for our employees. The retreat had to do with honesty in the workplace,
especially when dealing with uncomfortable subjects. Chief Judge Smith Camp
attended the meeting and was asked a question.
The question was this: Did the Chief Judge feel that Hercules and the umpire had
become an embarrassment to our Court. She responded that she thought 95[%] of the
posts were insightful, entertaining, well-written, and enlightening. Then she asked for a
show of hands, inquiring how many of the employees felt the blog had become an
embarrassment to our Court. The great majority raised their hands. The Chief then told
them that she appreciated their candor, and that she would share with me their
sentiments.
RGK, Some Things Are More Important than Others, HERCULES & UMPIRE (July 9,
2015), https://herculesandtheumpire.com/2015/07/ [https://perma.cc/ZDC7-NV28]. It
would appear that his remarks had caused even the employees not to be confident in the
court.
2 77 See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 385-86 (1987) (finding that statement
wishing the shooter of President Reagan would "get him" next time, in the context of a
conversation about Reagan's policies, was on a matter of public concern).2 7 8 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 25, r. 4.1.
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difficulties with Senator Cruz, sprinkling throughout his conclusion that Cruz
was unfit.279
Balanced against his strong interest as a citizen is the State's interest in
keeping the judiciary above the political fray. The comments to Rule 4.1
describe the concern: "judges and judicial candidates must, to the greatest extent
possible, be free and appear to be free from political influence and political
pressure." 280 If they are seen to be subject to political influence, "[p]ublic
confidence in the independence and impartiality of the judiciary is eroded." 2 81
This seems a far stronger interest than the judge making clear his personal
opposition to a single presidential candidate. And once again, Judge Kopf's
primary objection to Senator Cruz-Cruz's desire that the Supreme Court be
subject to retention elections 282-could easily have been aired as a policy
discussion on that point rather than as a diatribe against Cruz.
Further, as has been proposed here, a presumption should run in favor of the
State when the State has been specific and limited in its speech prohibitions. 283
That is the case here: Rule 4.1 of the Model Code (and actually, Canon 5A(2)
of the federal judicial code) prohibits judges from endorsing or opposing
candidates.2 84 Thus, under the modified Pickering balance here, Judge Kopf is
entitled to no First Amendment protection.
All three of his remarks could result in constitutional discipline.
VII. CONCLUSION
When a judge uses a racial slur, gives in-chambers interviews to the press
during a case, campaigns for the governor, comments on a woman's breasts or
a man's build, solicits litigators in his or her courtroom for campaign money, or
threatens a police officer writing a ticket, that judge knows that he or she has
committed an ethical violation. The judge knows that the judicial institution,
and the people, expect the judge to be beyond reproach, and that any of those
remarks will damage the reputation of the bench. Indeed, the judge has known
this since taking the bench. The ethical rules were in place.
2 7 9 RGK, supra note 253.
280 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 25, r. 4.1, cmt. 1.
281Id r. 4.1, cmt. 3.2 82 RGK, supra note 253.
283 It is important to note that Judge Kopf knew at least generally that he was not
supposed to be speaking politically. The blog begins:
As a federal judge, I am duty bound not to play politics. However, when a politician
makes an extreme proposal to amend the Constitution and fundamentally alter and harm
the federal judiciary and the Supreme Court, I have the right as a federal judge, and dare
I say the duty, to respond to the proposal.
Id.
284 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 25, r. 4.1(A)(3); Federal Judicial
Code, supra note 21, canon 5(A)(2).
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In the event extrajudicial speech like this is reported and prosecuted, the
state commissions or judicial councils imposing discipline should not have to
face strict scrutiny for a judge's violation. While we recognize a judge's rights
as a citizen, ajudge shares with all other employee citizens the duty not to harm
the judge's employer by engaging in conduct known to be prohibited from day
one. Thus, the balancing test from Pickering should be applied and the judge
excused only if the reason for the speech, and its public interest value, outweighs
the State's interest in the integrity of the bench.
